The Effect of Convicton on Income Through the Life Cycle by Daniel Nagin & Joel Waldfogel
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE EFFECT OF CONVICTION




Working Paper No. 4551




We thank Linda Babcock, Donald Fullerton, Lowell Taylor, Joe Tracy, and seminar
participants at Carnegie Mellon and Yale for helpful comments. All errors, of course, remain
our own. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Law and Economics. Any
opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.NBER Working Paper #4551
November 1993
THE EFFECT OF CONVICTION
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LIFE CYCLE
ABSTRACT
Existing studies of the impact of conviction on income and employment do not
consider life cycle issues. We postulate that conviction reduces access to career jobs offering
stable, long-term employment. Instead, conviction relegates offenders to spot market jobs,
which may have higher pay at the outset of the career but do not offer stable employment or
rapidly rising wages. Thus, first-time Conviction may increase the wages of young workers
while decreasing the wages of older workers. We test our theory with data on federal
offenders and find that first-time conviction has a positive and significant effect on income for
offenders under age 25 and an increasingly negative and significant impact for offenders over
age 30. These results imply that the present value of income lost as a result of conviction
varies over the life cycle, reaching a maximum in the middle of the career. We find that the
gains sought by these offenders follow similar profiles, suggesting that prospective offenders
are deterred by the possibility of lost future income. Because the discounted loss in future
income facing young offenders may be small, our results may provide part of an explanation
of youth crime.
Daniel Nagin Joel Waldiogel
H. John Heinz School of Public Policy Department of Economics
Carnegie Mellon University Yale University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213 New Haven, CT 06520
and NBERA growing literature indicates that arrest and conviction limit legal earning opportunities.
Recent studies find that the market penalty of lost income is large, both absolutely and in
comparison with fines and prison terms (Lott, 1992; Waldfogel, 1994a). Furthermore, the
adverse effects of arrest and conviction are at least somewhat persistent (Waldfogel, l994b;
Grogger, 1992). The large and growing involvement of urban youth in crime is thus alarming
not only because of the direct harm to victims but also because of the damage that young
offenders are doing to their own long-term economic prospects'. Many youths are choosing
criminal activity in the face of seemingly enormous market penalties.
While recent studies of the stigmatizing effect of conviction and arrest consistently find
that contact with the criminal justice system increases job instabiit?, evidence of the effect of
conviction on income is mixed. Lou (1992) and Waldfogel (1994a) find that conviction reduces
income, while Nagin and Waldfogel (1992) find that conviction increases the income of young
offenders.
Here we reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings on the impact of Conviction on
income with a theory, and new evidence, which may also help explain youth involvement in
'See Freeman (1990), or Mauer (1990) for discussions of the involvement of minority youth
in crime.
2Recent studies discussed in the text estimate conviction effects using longitudinal data.
These studies include Freeman (1990), Grogger (1992), Waldfogel (1994a), and Nagin and
Waldfogel (1992). A significant earlier literature attempted to measure the effect of
rehabilitation programs on economic opportunities using cross-sectional post-conviction data.
See, for example, Cook (1975) or Witte and Reid (1980). There is also small body of
experimental evidence on this subject (Boshier and Derek, 1974; Buikhuisen and Dijksterhaus,
1971; Schwartz and Skolnick, 1962). In these studies employers are presented with job
applications with and without reported criminal records. All of the studies find stigma effects.2
crime. We postulate that conviction reduces access to "career jobs"--jobs that offer the prospect
of stable, long-term employment. Instead, conviction limits offenders' legal employment
opportunities to spot market jobs which may pay young workers more than career jobs but offer
little prospect of stable employment or rapidly rising wages. Based on human capital theory,
we argue that career jobs will have steeper wage trajectories than spot market jobs but will also
have lower starting wages. Consequently, conviction may raise wages if experienced early in
a worker's career but reduce wages if experienced later. Because the Nagin and Waldfogel
(1992) study is based on a cohort of young men just starting their work careers whereas the
results reported in Lou (1992) and Waldfogel (1994a) are based on a sample of generally older
workers, this "life cycle" theory reconciles the different prior findings.
We test our theory by measuring conviction effects for federal fraud offenders of various
ages. We find that first-time conviction has a positive and significant effect on income for
offenders under age 25 and an increasingly negative and significant impact for offenders over
age 30. Subsequent convictions, by contrast, reduce income at all ages which, for reasons
described below, is also consistent with our theory. We recognize that the fraud offenders in
our data are an atypical group of offenders, so we examine limited available data on federal
larcenists, who are more like typical offenders. This analysis also supports our theory.
Our results imply that the present value of income lost as a result of conviction varies
over the life cycle and, in particular, is a single-peaked function of age that reaches a maximum
in the middle of the career. If our results, based on convicted offenders, are applicable to
potential offenders, then this variation in the market penalty for conviction implies that the
deterrent threat of lost income facing individuals without criminal records is smaller for youth3
than for mid-career adults. This may provide part of the explanation for the disproportionate
involvement of youth in crime. Furthermore, if prospective offenders are deterred by the
possibility of lost income, then the age variation we find in the market penalty for conviction
implies that the criminal gain required to offset the risk of incurring this penalty will also have
a humped shape over the life cycle, all other things being equal. In accordance with this
prediction, we find that the gains sought by fraud and larceny offenders are single-peaked
functions of offender age and that the profiles of both market penalties and dollar gains peak at
about the same age.
II. Conviction and the Life Cycle
1. Conviction Effects
Human capital theory (Becker, 1964) predicts rising wage trajectories and stable
employment in jobs where workers and employers jointly invest in firm-specific human capital.
Early in the career, the worker takes some of his compensation as training, so the money wage
is below the value of his marginal product. Wages rise over the course of the career as the
individual accumulates human capital and experiences a declining implicit reduction in take-home
pay to cover training costs. The joint investment of employee and employer in firm-specific
human capital also creates an incentive for maintaining a stable long-term employment
relationship. For this reason we term such jobs Ncareerw jobs.
We postulate that individuals with criminal records will have reduced access to career
jobs. Employers providing career jobs will be reluctant to invest in individuals with criminal
records because such records signal that the individuals may be prone tostealingfrom the firm4
or harming customers or other employees. More generally, a criminal record signals that an
individual is untrustworthy. With reduced employment opportunities in the career job market,
individuals with criminal records will tend to be limited to employment in what we call spot
market jobs. In such jobs there is little joint investment in firm-specific human capital. Thus,
human capital theory suggests that spot market jobs will have flatter wage trajectories, and will
be more unstable, than career jobs. Wage trajectories will be flatter because of less investment
in human capital. They will be less stable because neither the employer nor the employee has
as much of a stake in the ongoing employment relationship.
If conviction causes workers to move from steeply-sloped career wage profiles to less
steeply-sloped "spot market wage profiles, then the effect of conviction will vary depending on
when it occurs in the life cycle. Consider Figure 1. Career workers' wages follow the steeply-
sloped profile whereas the wage trajectory of workers in the spot market follows a less steeply-
sloped spot market trajectory. At some age t, the wage of individuals without criminal records
equals the spot wage available to convicted individuals3. By shifting workers from steeply-
sloped to flatter wage paths, conviction causes an immediate increase -butan ultimate reduction
-inthe wage of workers younger than age t and an immediate and long-term reduction in the
wage for workers over age t4.
3While we have drawn the career profiles as monotonically increasing, we recognize that
human capital depreciation, as in Ben-Porath (1967), could cause our careerw profile to dip near
retirement.
4Our argument that conviction relegates individuals to spot market jobs is reminiscent of
secondary labor market (SLM) theories (c.f., Gordon, 1975; Harrison, 1972). Our argument,
however, is fundamentally different. SLM theories argue that individuals are relegated to
working in poorly paying, insecure SLMs based on characteristics such as race and gender that
have no bearing on productivity. By contrast, we are arguing that conviction signals5
2. Lost Income and Deterrence
At any point in time (r),thetotal effect of conviction on income of an individual in the
career market is the discounted value of career wage income (ye) less spot wage income (y,).
Assuming retirement with certainty at T and that conviction permanently moves the individual
to the spot market path5, the present value of the change in lifetime income, which we term the




where=11(1+5) and ô is a discount rate.The difference, y -y3,can be thought of as the
current value of legal obedience rents, and the present value of such rents is the opportunity cost
of conviction at time r.
Wewould expect equalization of the discounted utility of the spot vs. career jobs
(Polachek and Siebert, 1993) but only measured at the outset of the career and not thereafter.
Thus, while PVOR(O) would equal 0 if utility were based only on income, we expect discounted
obedience rents to be positive for r>0. Once an individual has begun investing in a career job,
the present value of future income, as of that time until retirement, will exceed the present value
of spot market income over that same period. Thus, among career workers, discounted income
losses from being relegated to the spot market are small only for those at the beginning or the
untrustworthiness, a characteristic that does affect productivity.
5Evidence on the persistence of stigma effects is limited but that which is available suggests
that decay rates are slow and thereby that the adverse effects are long lasting (Waldfogel, 1994b;
Grogger, 1992). Note that our framework does not necessarily assume persistence.The degree
of persistence is captured by the discount rate ô. Greater persistence corresponds to a lower
discount rate.6
end of their careers.
PVOR(r)'s trajectory over the life cycle depends on the discount rate and the shape of
pre- and post-conviction income profiles. Figure 2 shows the present value of obedience rents
over the life cycle for various discount rates and assuming the stylized income profiles in Figure
1. With a zero discount rate, PVOR reaches a maximum at the age when career income
surpasses the spot income available to convicts. For higher discount rates, the PVOR maximum
comes later. All PVOR profiles calculated assuming that the career trajectory crosses the spot
trajectory from below have a humped shape, which implies that the highest opportunity cost of
conviction occurs during mid-career. If the post-conviction profile is below the pre-conviction
profile for all ages, the PVOR profile can be either hump-shaped or can decline monotonically.
PVOR(r) traces out variation over the work career in the deterrent threat stemming from
the market penalty for conviction. Thus, assuming the distribution of criminal opportunities does
not vary over the work career, the probability of offending should be inversely related to the
level of PVOR(r), where offending probability increases as PVOR decreases. Figure 3 depicts
the predicted "U-Shaped" time path of probability of offending (for a hump-shaped PVOR)
where this probability reaches its minimum at the time when PVOR(r) reaches its maximum6.
PVOR(r)'s shape also has implications for changes over the work career in the minimum
dollar gain from offending required to balance expected costs. We expect the minimum gain
6Figure 3 implies that sometime following middle age the incidence of offending should
begin increasing. All available evidence suggests a monotonic decline in offending through
adulthood (see for example Wilson and Hermstein, 1985). This suggests that the noneconomic
costs of crime, for example, loss of standing in the community, increase with age. It is also
possible that available data on offending disproportionately undercount offenses most likely to
be committed by elderly individuals.7
necessaryto induce law-breaking to be positively related to PVOR(r). Thus, if PVOR is hump-
shaped, as depicted in Figure 3, then gains sought by offenders should similarly be hump-shaped
withageand furthermore should have a maximum which coincides with that of PVOR(r).
ifi. Data
Thedataforthis study are assembled from the administrative records of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO). The data consist of a two-observation panel on
the legal income of criminals, with one observation before, and one after conviction. Pre-
conviction data are extracted from pre-sentence investigation reports and post-conviction data
are taken from monthly probation reports. The primary sample used in this analysis is
comprised of males convicted of fraud in the U.S. federal courts in 1984 who are released from
probationary supervision by the end of 1987. For these individuals we have both pre- and post-
conviction measures of income.
Pre-conviction income is measured for the year prior to conviction; and post-conviction
income is measured for the last year of probationary supervision, usually about two years after
the pre-conviction income observation. Both pre- and post-conviction income are measured by
average monthly income from all legal sources -wagesfrom legitimate employment,
scholarships, disability and welfare payments, investment and pension income, and so on. While
data on wages would be ideal for this study, none are available, nor are data available on hours
worked. In addition to the income data, the data set includes an estimate of the dollars involved
in the offense for which the individual was convicted as well the offender's age, race, region,8
marital status, and education7.
As will be discussed, the principal focus of the analysis is the subset of men with no
prior convictions. Of the 7094 men convicted of fraud in federal courts in 1984, 4237haveno
prior convictions. Of these first-time convicts, 2097 were released from supervision by the end
of 1987 and are thereby candidates for inclusion in the sample of individuals with both pre- and
post-conviction income data. Of this group, 1336 had valid data on both pre- and post-
conviction income and on other variables of interest. We acknowledge that this winnowing
process raises obvious questions of sample selection, but we also note that the pre-conviction
monthly income of the entire population of fraud offenders with no prior convictions ($2503)
is virtually identical to that of the 1336 who are the principal focus of our analysis ($2535).
Furthermore, we note that the probability of completing supervision by the end of 1987 does not
vary by age, a variable we use as a surrogate for pre-conviction job tenure.
IV. Analysis
This section examines four empirical questions relevant to the theory advanced above.
First, how does first-time conviction affect job stability over the life cycle? Second, does the
effect of first-time conviction on income vary over the life cycle so that conviction raises the
income of young workers and decreases the income of older workers? Third, is the conviction
effect over the life cycle different for workers who already have criminal records? Fourth, do
the gains sought through fraud vary by the age of the offender in a way that follows the age
trajectory of PVOR?
7See Waldfogel (1994a) for a more detailed description of the data.9
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the demographic characteristics of first-time fraud
and larceny convicts. Companion statistics, if available, are also provided for the broader
population of convicted offenders in the criminal justice system (CJS). Fraud offenders are
clearly not representative of offenders at large in the CJS; they are older, more likely to be
white, and far better educated than other offenders. Federal larcenists are more similar to
typical offenders in the CJS than are fraud offenders. Hence, at the end of the paper we also
report analyses of the limited available data on larcenists to provide perspective on the generality
of our findings.
Before turning to the findings, we make an observation on measurement. Our theory
assumes that conviction reduces access to career jobs but does not assume that individuals
without convictions will necessarily work in career jobs. If all individuals hold career jobs prior
to conviction and spot market jobs afterward, the observed income difference for any age will
equal the distance between career and spot market profiles. In reality, some workers may hold
spot market jobs prior to conviction, and some may hold career jobs afterward. While we
assume that a higher fraction of offenders hold career jobs before than after, the possibility that
pre- and post-conviction income averages reflect workers in both types of jobswill tend to make
the observed effect of conviction on income smaller (in absolute value) than the difference
between career and spot profiles at any age.
1. First-Time Conviction and Employment
Consider first the prediction that conviction increases job instability by reducing access
to career jobs. Unlike the prediction that first-time conviction's impact on income varies over10
the work career, the theory does not predict that the change in job stability will depend on prior
work experience; first-time conviction shifts the worker from a stable career profile to an
unstable spot profile at any point in the work career and should therefore increase job instability
throughout the career.
The data set lacks a direct measure of job stability, such as number of jobs held. We
thus use an indirect measure of the impact of conviction on job stability--the change in the
fraction of individuals with positive income between the times of their pre- and post-conviction
income observations. We interpret a post-conviction decline in this proportion as an indication
of more sporadic employment and therefore greater job instability.
Table 2 reports the change in the proportion of first-time convicts with positive income
by age of conviction, our proxy for work experience. Consistent with the findings of Freeman
(1991) and Nagin and Waldfogel (1992) that conviction reduces legal labor market opportunities,
the fraction of first-time federal fraud offenders with positive income declines significantly, from
90.4% to 85.0%. Between ages 18 and 49 the decline is stable and under 5%.Fromage 50
to 59thedecline is only modestly higher -about7%. Only convicts over 59 suffer a materially
larger decline in positive income probability than the other age groups. We suspect that many
of these convicts simply retired following their conviction. While the evidence of the impact
of Conviction on job stability is based on a very imperfect measure, it accords with the theory:
Conviction increases job instability no matter when experienced in the work career.
2. First-Time Conviction and Income
Consider next the impact of first-time conviction on income. Table 3 reports the mean11
and median percentage difference between pre- and post-conviction real income for the sub-
sample of first-time convicts who had positive income both before and after conviction. The
results are consistent with prior research and with the predictions of the theory. The average
percent change in income following conviction is -7.7% (with a t-statistic of -3.33). The median
change is somewhat smaller, -3.8% (with a Wilcoxon signed rank statistic of -2.87), but still
negative. The change, however, differs enormously across age groups. Young workers actually
experience an increase in income; individuals convicted prior to age 25 experience on average
a 24.1 % increase in income. Thereafter, the change declines monotonically with age. The
average change for individuals convicted between ages 25 and 39 is insignificantly different from
0. After age 39 the effects turn negative, and increasingly so. For individuals convicted after
age 59, the average decline is over a third. The same pattern of changes is mirrored in the
medians -themedian percent change in income is positive and significant for young offenders,
but for older individuals who have presumably accumulated more human capital at pre-
conviction jobs, the change eventually reverses sign and becomes increasingly negative.
The results reported in Table 3 are precisely in accord with the theory, but the
measurement procedure, a simple contrast of pre- and post-conviction income, suffers from a
potential bias depicted in Figure 4. Consider first the measurement of the negative impact of
conviction on income that is predicted to occur later in the work career. This change is
measured by the difference in income between points A (pre-conviction income) and B (post-
conviction income). The correct measure of the conviction effect, however, is the income
difference between points C and B, where C measures what income would have been at the time
of the post-conviction income measurement, had the individual not been convicted. As can be12
seen from the figure, failure to account for the growth in income that would have occurred
between the measurements of pre- and post-conviction income absent conviction results in an
understatement of the negative impact of conviction. Figure 4 also illustrates the analogous -
butopposite -measurementbias arising for young workers. During the period when spot market
jobs pay more than career jobs, simple differencing of pre- and post-conviction wages, E-D,
overstates the true positive short-term impact of conviction on income, E-F8.
To control for the potential bias depicted in Figure 4, we estimate the following two-
equation model describing pre- and post-first-conviction income as function of age and other
other factors may also be biasing our results. One is that by restricting our sample
to individuals with positive income pre- and post-conviction the summary statistics in Table 3
may misrepresent the income penalty of conviction for the entire population of first time
convicts. In practice this does not appear to be a problem. It is not possible to compute
percentage changes for individuals with no income. We can, however, compute group averages
by age. The changes in average income by age, including those with no income, mirror the
pattern in Table 3. The under-age 25 group experience a 22.5% increase in income following
first time conviction. Thereafter, the change declines monotonically; the changes for the age
groups 25-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60 and over are, respectively, -2.2%, -8.6%, -15.8%, -
23.6%,and -45.3%.
A second potential source of bias is the impact of imprisonment on post-conviction
income. Although it is theoretically possible that our results are driven by human capital
depreciation while in prison, empirically this is not the case. When we exclude the 26 percent
of the sample punished by imprisonment, we obtain nearly identical results.
A third potential source of bias is the impact of being charged with a crime on pre-
conviction income. Some of the individuals in our sample may have been dismissed from their
jobs prior to Conviction simply because they had been charged with a crime. This seems
particularly likely if they were charged with defrauding their employer. We have no basis for
assessing whether such pre-conviction discharges from employment occurred to any appreciable
extent but if they did, our estimates of the negative impact of conviction are understated. Thus,
it is possible that even the youngest workers suffered a decline in annualized income. We note,
however, that pre-conviction job dismissal does not explain the main result of this section, that
first-time conviction effects vary over the life cycle.
A fourth potential source of bias is that prior to conviction individuals may participate
in crime because of a temporary reduction in their legal income. If so, then the change in legal
income experienced with conviction will understate the negative effect of conviction on earning
ability. However, unless this bias varies by age, it will not affect our basic results.13
factors:
PRE: = XJi+a1age4; + a2age. + Tli,.k, (la)
/ / 2 (ib)
POST y= Xj3' + ajageg ÷ a2age, +
whereX isavector of characteristics of individual i measured at the time of conviction
(education, race, marital status, and region), agedisoffender i's age at time t (our measure of
work experience), and y, is offender i's log income at time t (period t-k refers to pre-conviction
while period t refers to post-conviction)9. Note that the pre- and post-conviction income
equations have different intercepts and age profiles. The estimated conviction effect depends on
age and is
(X +&1age1 + â2age) - (X(i+âage + aage5.
Thisestimation approach controls for income growth between pre- and post-conviction income
observations under the assumption that the individual's income would have followed the pre-
conviction age-income trajectory in the absence of conviction. By contrast, the raw differences
in Table 3 correspond to a case in which the individual gains no experience between pre- and
post-conviction income observations. This is equivalent to assuming that absent conviction,
offenders' income would have remained at its pre-conviction level.
To control for the effect of time-stable individual differences on pre- and post-conviction
income, the model is estimated both as a fixed and random effects specification. Appendix
9The specification in equations la and lb allows for a quadratic income profile while figure
4 is drawn, for simplicity, assuming linearity.14
Table Al reports the coefficient estimates of the random effects model; the less efficient fixed
effects estimates give rise to nearly identical conviction effect estimates'°. These estimates
imply a pre-conviction income profile that starts below and ends above the post-conviction
income profile. Table 4 reports age-varying estimates of first-time conviction's effect on income
for two worker profiles (single, white and high school or college educated) from the random
effects model. The results mirror those reported in Table 3. First-time conviction has a positive
effect on the income of workers under age 30. After age 30 the impact becomes increasingly
negative. Thus, both tabular and regression results support the idea that conviction shifts
workers off of career profiles.
Ideally, we would supplement our tests on income by examining the types of jobs held
before and after conviction, but our data include no information on the types of jobs held before
or after conviction. Thus, it is not possible to examine directly whether conviction is associated
with reduced participation in career jobs. Nagin and Waldfogel (1992), however, report direct
evidence of such reduced participation among young British men. These men experience a sharp
decline in participation in apprenticeships and in employment at jobs requiring training following
their first adult conviction.
3. Conviction Effects on Offenders with Prior Convictions
The results presented thus far pertain to the subsample of first-time convicts. Table 5
isthe counterpart of Table 3 for the sub-sample of individuals who had been convicted prior to
their fraud conviction in 1984. Unlike for first-time convicts, there is no relationship between
'°'The Wu-Hausman statistic is 0.74, far below the X4)295percent critical value of 36.42.15
the changein incomeand age. With one exception, all age groups, including the youngest,
experience significant declines in income. Hence, subsequent conviction doesnotappear to
causeworkers to move to a profile with a higher intercept and lower slope, as is true for first-
time convicts.
The existence of a market penalty for convictions beyond the first has a number of
interpretations, one of which is not strictly within the structure of our model. First, the types
of spot market jobs available to first-time convicts may not be the most low-paying and unstable.
Such jobs may be the domain of individuals with multiple convictions who, by their repetition
of criminal behavior, most clearly signal that they are untrustworthy. A second interpretation
that is compatible with our model's single spot market begins with the observation that our
theory does not require that the wage trajectory in the spot market be flat, just less steep than
in the career market. The first conviction may relegate the individual to a single spot market,
and the impact of each additional conviction may be to move the individual back along the spot
market wage trajectory. In the extreme the individual's initial wage following each Conviction
is the starting spot market wage. Such movement back along an upward-sloping spot market
trajectory would result in a decline in income following each conviction beyond the first. This
interpretation can explain why the decline in income beyond the first conviction is unrelated to
age. Unlike for first-time convicts, age is not expected to be correlated with current job
tenure".
4. Lost Income and Deterrence
"We would have liked to measure the relationship between the size of second-time
conviction effects and time elapsed since first conviction, but we do not observe the time elapsed
since each individual's previous convictions.16
According to the theory the age profile of gains sought by offenders should coincide with
the age proffle of PVOR(r). Testing this prediction requires an estimate of the PVOR(r) profile.
To compute the PVOR(r) profile relevant to workers without criminal records, we use pre- and
post-first-conviction income trajectories projected from the age-income relationships implied in
the estimates of eqs. Ia & lb. We interpret the pre-conviction age-income relationship estimated
in eq. la as the path that a worker would experience over time by assuming that age is a
reasonable proxy for pre-conviction work experience and that there are no period or cohort
effects mediating the relationship between age and income.
Inferring the prospective post-first-conviction income trajectory from the estimate of eq.
lb requires even stronger assumptions because post-conviction income observations are taken
shortly (about two years) after the first conviction. Thus, the post-conviction age-income
relationship can be interpreted as a profile of post-conviction startingwagesin the spot market
by age of first conviction'2. Because it is based on starting pay, the post-first-conviction profile
does not necessarily indicate the prospective income trajectory to be experienced following
conviction.Identifying the income profile experienced after conviction requires income
observations taken at varying intervals after conviction (including some more than two years
after conviction). If, long after conviction, income remains on the age-income profile defined
by eq. Ib, this relationship can also be interpreted as the income path actually experienced
following conviction.
One source of identifying evidence on the shape of the post-conviction profile is pre-
second conviction data. Some fraud offenders are convicted for a second time in 1984, and
'2We are grateful to Bengt Holmstrom for pointing this out.17
these convictions occur at varying -albeitunknown -intervalsfollowing the first conviction.'3
If the profile estimated on post-first-conviction (starting) pay also accurately describes pre-
second-conviction income, then we have some evidence that the profile estimated in eq. lb is
the income path experienced following a first conviction and is therefore relevant to calculations
of prospective discounted foregone income. Indeed, this is what we find: We cannot reject the
hypothesis that the age trajectory of pre-second-conviction income equals the age trajectory of
post-first-conviction income, all else constant. We thus estimate PVOR by assuming that, after
conviction, an ex-offender's income follows the post-conviction income profile estimated in eq.
lb.
Figure 5 depicts the present values of obedience rents for individuals without criminal
records. These PVOR profiles are derived from pre- and post-conviction income profiles for
discount rates of 5%, 10%, and 20%. At their maximum the present values of obedience rents
are quite substantial. They range from nearly $60,000 in present value for a 5% discount rate
to about $25,000 for a 20% discount rate. Note that these calculations do not necessarily
assume complete persistence of the conviction effect. For example, a 20% discount rate in our
model is equivalent to a 10% psychic discount rate in conjunction with post-conviction income
that converges back toward the pre-conviction trajectory at 8.3% per year (1/(1+20%)
(11(1 + l0%))(l00% -8.3%))'.
Table 6 reports various summary statistics characterizing the relationship between dollar
'3Waldfogel (1994b) infers from the cross-sectional pattern of age and total prior convictions
that over 8 years elapse, on average, between convictions.
'4Results in Waldfogel (1994b) suggest that the rate of convergence of the post-conviction
profile back to the pre-conviction profile is no more than 10 percent per year.18
gains and age of first conviction. Observe that the mean gain for fraud is generally several
orders of magnitude larger than the median gain. This is because the distribution of gains is
very highly skewed. Nonetheless, whether measured by the mean or byvarious order statistics,
the distribution of gains from fraud opportunities that were undertaken by convicted offenders
follows the hump-shaped trajectory of PVOR; gains rise monotonically through the younger age
groupings, reach a maximum between ages 50 and 60 (the 75thpercentilemaximum occurs
between 40 and 50), and then decline in the oldest age group. Observe that for discount rates
of 10% and 20% the maximum of PVOR coincides with the maximum of the gains distribution
as reported in Table 6- between age 50 and 60. At the 5% rate the PVOR maximum occurs
at only a modestly lower age -aboutage 45. Thus, the maximums of both the gains and PVOR
functions appear to coincide at reasonable discount rates. We note, however, that dollars
involved in the offenses may follow opportunity, which, in turn, may follow income. The
estimated pre-conviction income profile for fraud offenders reaches a maximum at age 56.
Hence, we can only say that these data are consistent with our deterrence explanation.
Our theory predicts that the probability of offending will be negatively related with
PVOR, holding access to criminal opportunities constant. However, because we have no direct
evidence on the criminal opportunities confronting potential offenders by age, we cannot test this
incidence prediction.It is this same lack of information that prevents our observation that
dollars involved in offenses follow PVOR to be more than simply consistent with, rather than
evidence for, a deterrent effect stemming from PVOR.
5. Do the Results Hold for Larcenists?19
According to the characteristics listed in Table 1, federal fraud offenders are atypical
U.S. criminals. Federal larcenists are also atypical, but considerably less so. To provide
perspective on the generality of our findings for fraud offenders, we repeat the basic elements
of our analysis on a small sample of federal larcenists (n=397)1S. The results are summarized
in Table 7. The findings on income are quite similar to those for fraud offenders. Conviction
increases the income of offenders under 25,whileit has an increasingly negative effect on the
income of offenders over 30. The median dollar gains from larceny follow the clear hump-
shaped pattern predicted by the theory with the maximum occurring between age 40 and 49.
The hump-shaped pattern for the mean gains is less distinct but still present. Due to a few
outlying observations, the mean estimates, however, are rather erratic. The results for larcenists
are thus reasonably in accord with the theory and are supportive of its generality.
V. Conclusion
This paper presents evidence that first-time conviction effects vary substantially by age
while subsequent conviction effects do not. First-time conviction raises the income of young
offenders and reduces the income of older offenders, while subsequent conviction effects reduce
income at all ages. The results are rationalized by assuming that first-time conviction moves
workers off of career income profiles to less steeply sloped spot market profiles. Subsequent
convictions simply demonstrate that workers' marginal products are less valuable and/or move
them back along an upward sloping spot market wage trajectory. The results imply that the
The sample is constructed according to the same criteria used for the 1336 observation
sample of positive income fraud offenders.20
discounted prospective income loss due to conviction is hump-shaped over the career and, if
deterrence operates, that the pattern of gains sought by offenders should also follow this pattern.
Data on actual gains sought by convicted offenders are consistent with this prediction.
Our model of conviction's effect on job opportunities presumes that would-be offenders
have access to jobs offering the prospect of human capital accumulation.Given their
backgrounds it is reasonable to presume that most fraud offenders had access to career jobs prior
to their conviction. Indeed many probably used such access to perpetrate their frauds. It less
clear, however, whether the larger population of offenders generally have the skills to qualify
them for a career job even at an entry level. Thus, our findings may not generalize to the larger
population of individuals with criminal records. A replication on a more representative sample
of offenders is needed. In such a replication it would also be desirable to have data on the types
and number of jobs held before and after conviction. With such data the prediction that
conviction restricts access to career type jobs could be directly tested and also a more rigorous
test of the impact of conviction on job stability would be possible.
If the results do generalize they have important policy implications for crime control.
They suggest that in the short-run young offenders may suffer no income loss from conviction.
Combined with the tendency toward leniency in the sentencing of first-time convicts, this may
cause disincentives to crime to be small for young offenders, particularly those with high
discount rates. A possible solution is the institution of harsher penalties for juvenile and young
first-time offenders.Any such changes in sentencing policy designed to increase the
disincentives to crime among the young should, however, take into consideration the long term
market penalty of stigmatization even if this penalty is underappreciated or overly discounted by21
young offenders themselves. One possible mechanism for balancing short run incentives to
provide a deterrent threat with long term consequences is a policy of expunging the criminal






Average Age 42.1 33.3 29's







on the subsample of fraud offenders and larcenists who had positive income pre- and
post-conviction.
'5AJI convicts, from U.S. Department of Justice (1990a).
'6From U.S. Department of Justice (1990a).
'7Among prison inmates. U.S. Department of Justice (1990b).23
Table 2
Employment of Federal Fraud Offenders
before and after First Conviction, by Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)









all 1697 90.4 85.0 -5.4
(-5.29)
under 25 93 87.1 82.8 -4.3
(-0.82)
25-29 190 87.4 82.6 -4.7
(-1.53)
30-39 505 91.5 87.7 -3.8
(-2.20)






over 59 187 90.4 77.5 -12.8
(-3.50)
Samp1e includes federal fraud offenders convicted for the first time in 1984 and released
from probationary supervision by the end of 1987. Offenders are classified as "working" if they
have positive legal income. T-statistics are in parentheses.24
Table 3
Percent Difference between Pre- and Post-Conviction Income
for First-Time Federal Fraud Offenders'9

































'9Sample includes federal fraud offenders convicted for the first time in 1984 and released
from probationary supervision by the end of 1987. These individuals have positive legal income
both before and after conviction. T-statistics are in parentheses; Wilcoxon signed rank statistics
are in parentheses for medians.25
Table 4
Estimated Percent Conviction Effect, by Age°
age conviction effect for single,
high school educated white
male
conviction effect for single,

























20Average difference in log income, as calculated from equations la and lb. These estimates
control for experience growth under the assumption that the individual would have constantly
gained experience between pre- and post-conviction income observations absent conviction.26
Table 5
Percent Difference between Pre- and Post-Conviction Income for
Federal Fraud Offenders with Prior Convictions, by Age2'































21Sample includes federal fraud offenders convicted in 1984 (with prior convictions) and
released from supervision by the end of 1987. These individuals have positive legal income both
before and after the current conviction. T-statistics are in parentheses; Wilcoxon signed rank
statistics are in parentheses for medians.27
Table 6








all 1162 2,470,750 1,366 9,000 41,284
under 30 187 56,830 1,400 5,000 16,000
30-39 362 2,094,032 1,000 6,000 36,000
40-49 305 3,708,015 1,900 15,000 58,000
50-59 193 4,865,990 2,396 15,657 48,000
over 59 115 280,562 2,200 13,467 47,626
Note that the sample for this table is smaller than the fraud sample used to estimate income
conviction effects because of missing data on the dollars involved in the offense.28
Table 7
Effect of Larceny Conviction on Income and Dollar Gains, by Age"










































"Sample includes larcenists convicted for the first time in 1984 and released from
probationary supervision by the end of 1987. These individuals have positive legal income both
before and after conviction. T-statistics are in parentheses; Wilcoxon signed rank statistics are
parentheses for median income effects.
2'Not all observations have valid dollar data on dollars involved in the offense. Results are
similar when we examine income effects for offenders with valid dollar gain observations.29
Appendix Table Al
Coefficient Estimates from ML Random EffectsModel
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Discounted Obedience Rents for Fraud
• 5% discount rate—'-— 10% discount rate — 20% discount rat
Age